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Abstract This study shows that when borrowers’default probability on the
mortgage loan is unobservable to the lender, the latter can screen
borrowers by their combined choice of loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
and interest rate. It further demonstrates that when borrowers
signal their default risk by acquiring a credit score, then a
combined separating signaling and screening equilibrium is
attained. If the signaling cost is sufﬁciently small, the combined
signaling and screening equilibrium dominates the screening-
only equilibrium under both competitive and non-competitive
market frameworks. However, while, under the competitive
setting, borrowers beneﬁt from constituting a credit scoring
signaling system, the prospective gain is shifted to lenders under
imperfect competition. Finally, under both competitive and non-
competitive combined signaling and screening equilibria, the
study reveals that high and low risk borrowers, while acquiring
distinct credit scores (and therefore paying different interest
rates) might realize higher, lower, or identical LTV ratios. Hence,
any empirical test of the relation between LTV ratio and default
risk must incorporate the interrelation among the LTV ratio,
credit score, and interest rate.
A crucial factor in the efﬁcient operation of primary and secondary mortgage
markets is the ability to correctly price default risk. Hence, extensive real estate
economic research, both theoretical and empirical, is devoted to understanding the
different aspects of mortgage default.1 This paper builds on the asymmetric
information literature to theoretically examine the mutual role of credit scoring,
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, and loan interest rate in separating borrowers by default
risk in competitive and non-competitive mortgage markets.
The paper ﬁrst shows that when borrowers’ total ﬁnancial resources are not
perfectly observable to the lender, the latter can screen borrowers according to
their default risk by their combined choice of LTV ratio and interest rate. This162  Ben-Shahar
result stems from the fact that the wealthier the borrower is, the less costly it is
for one to choose a low LTV ratio loan, ceteris paribus. In return, the borrower
pays a lower interest rate.2
Moreover, when borrowers also signal their default risk by acquiring a credit score,
then a combined separating signaling and screening equilibrium is attained. That
is, borrowers are ﬁrst partially separated into subsets according to their credit
score,3 and each subset is then screened by the choice of LTV ratio and interest
rate to generate a combined fully separating signaling and screening equilibrium.
Ben-Shahar and Feldman (2003) develop a combined signaling and screening
methodology, in which borrowers default risk is ﬁrst partially separated by their
credit record and then fully separated by their choice of a couplet of loan maturity
and interest rate. They also show the conditions under which combined signaling
and screening equilibrium (with credit record, loan maturity, and interest rate)
Pareto dominates the screening equilibrium (with loan maturity and interest rate
only) under a competitive market framework.
In contrast, credit scoring and the choice of LTV ratio and interest rate separate
borrowers in the model presented here. Moreover, the analysis is extended to
examine the effect of a non-competitive market environment on both equilibrium
and welfare implications.
The paper shows that if the cost of the signaling mechanism (i.e., the credit scoring
system) is sufﬁciently small, then the added welfare, gained by signaling, beneﬁts
borrowers (lenders) in a (non-) competitive market.4
It also follows from the analysis that in the combined signaling and screening
equilibrium under both competitive and non-competitive mortgage markets, high
and low risk borrowers, while acquiring distinct credit scores (which eventually
affect their loan interest rate), might realize higher, lower, or identical LTV ratios.
Hence, one implication of the model is that an empirical test of the relation
between LTV ratio and default risk must incorporate the interrelation among the
LTV ratio, credit score, and loan interest rate.5
Essentially, default in this framework is triggered by liquidity crunch; thus the
degree of the default risk corresponds to the borrower’s initial endowment.
Lenders, however, cannot perfectly observe the borrower’s endowment (which is
only privately observed by the borrower) and, hence, cannot distinguish between
borrowers’ default risks. It is shown that, because low endowment is also
associated with greater cost of both giving up on high LTV and establishing a
good credit record, a correspondence emerges among credit scores, LTVs, and
default risks. Moreover, it turns out that there exists an equilibrium under which
borrowers’ default risk is fully revealed by borrowers’ attained credit score
(signaling) and LTV (screening).
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) were among the ﬁrst to focus on the asymmetric
information argument in credit markets to motivate rational credit rationing. TheyDefault, Credit Scoring, and Loan-to-Value  163
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show that both the interest rate and the collateral on the loan may screen
borrower’s default risk. More recently, Brueckner (2000) and Harrison,
Noordewier, and Yavas (2004) develop this intuition within the mortgage market
framework.6 Brueckner assumes that borrowers vary by default cost and that
default follows a ruthless discretion. He derives a competitive separating screening
equilibrium in which low (high) default cost—and thus riskier (safer)—borrowers
self-select by choosing a high (low) LTV ratio for which they pay a greater
(smaller) premium. Harrison et al. also examine how borrowers may be screened
by their LTV ratio choice in a competitive environment. Speciﬁcally, they show
that if default cost is sufﬁciently high (low), then a separating equilibrium is
attained, where safer (riskier) borrowers self-select by choosing high LTV
mortgage loans. Moreover, they show that there is a mid-level of default cost,
which results in a pooling equilibrium. The required single crossing property for
separation in this study is the borrower’s probability of experiencing a reduction
in income; borrowers with high probability are, of course, more likely to default.
It should be noted, however, that our analysis differs from all of these studies,
among other things, in considering the role of a credit scoring system and further
focusing on non-competitive markets.
Studying mortgage origination under imperfect competition is of particular interest
because of the frequently observed structure of mortgage markets worldwide. A
growing body of literature presents empirical evidence of monopolistic power in
the mortgage market of Canada (Heffernan, 1994), the United Kingdom (Devreux
and Lanot, 2003; and Heffernan, 2006), the Netherlands (Swank, 1995), France
(Gary-Bobo and Larribeau, 2004), as well as several other European Union
countries (Neven and Roller, 1999). Furthermore, Hermalin and Jaffee (1996)
claim that the two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)—Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac—effectively monopolize the secondary mortgage market in the
United States, while Gan and Riddiough (2008, p. 6) add that the GSE sets ‘‘the
basis for the loan rates we see in the retail mortgage marketplace’’ and ‘‘as a
result, the GSE in effect lends directly to consumers.’’ According to Gan and
Riddiough, the market dominance of the GSEs is achieved via regulatory barriers,
government subsidies that are translated into lower cost of capital, and information
advantage in credit evaluation. Hence, most retail mortgage originators simply
‘‘passively apply the GSE’s credit evaluation model to screen loan applicants and
automatically sell qualiﬁed loans at guaranteed prices’’ determined by the GSE.
The authors conclude that ‘‘despite a large number of retail mortgage lenders, vast
segments of the U.S. residential mortgage market have strong monopolistic
characteristics,’’ (p. 4).7 This growing evidence of the lack of competition in
mortgage markets worldwide has led to an accumulating theoretical analysis of
the non-competitive behavior of the players in the market and its implications;
our study thus further extends this line of research (see, among others, Parlour
and Rajan, 2001; Hyytinen, 2003; Niinimaki, 2004; Bond, Musto, and Yilmaz,
2006; and Gan and Riddiough, 2008).
The model is constructed in the next section. The screening equilibrium under
competitive and non-competitive markets, respectively, is derived next, followed164  Ben-Shahar
by the derivation of the combined signaling and screening equilibrium under
competitive and non-competitive frameworks, respectively. Next, there is a
comparison and examination of the welfare and distributional implications of the
screening equilibrium and the combined signaling and screening equilibrium
under both competitive and non-competitive frameworks. The paper closes with
concluding remarks.
 The Model
Consider a two-period world in which a risk-averse individual seeks to ﬁnance
the purchase of an asset, the value of which equals A. The borrower is offered a
mortgage loan in the ﬁrst period, which the borrower is required to repay in full
in the next period at a periodic interest rate cost of r. Denote the mortgage LTV
ratio by L. Also, denote the borrower’s initial endowment by w and suppose that
in the second period the borrower’s resources change to w  x,  (x, where xx ),
x is a random variable with a differentiable density function g(x) and some
bounded variance and x is the minimum (maximum) realization of x.8 The (x)
borrower’s indirect utility function,9 (), from the loan is then:
(w, A, L, r)  u(w  LA)
x
   v(w  x  LA  LAr)g(x)dx 
LALArw
LALArw
 v(c)g(x)dx , (1) 
x
where u() and v() are the indirect utility functions in periods one and two,
respectively, both assumed to exhibit positive ﬁrst derivative and negative second
derivative; w and w  x are the individual’s endowment in the ﬁrst and second
period, respectively; L is the LTV ratio; ,0   1, is a time preference factor;
and c is a constant. Equation (1) asserts that for ﬁnancing the purchase of an asset
whose value equals A, the borrower ﬁrst pays a sum equal to (1  L)A (i.e.,
obtains a net total of LA) in the ﬁrst period. Then, in the second period, the
borrower is required to repay LA(1  r). However, a repayment occurs only if the
borrower’s budget sufﬁces, that is, if w  x  LA(1  r) [put differently, if x
sustains x  LA(1  r)  w]; otherwise, the borrower defaults.10 In the latter
case, the borrower is left with some ﬁxed amount c.
Note that c is relatively small since it represents the residual wealth in the case
that the borrower cannot repay the loan. It is thus assumed, without loss of
generality, that c  0.11 Also, note that in order to rationalize the non-ruthless
default on the part of the borrower (in the case where the asset value exceeds theDefault, Credit Scoring, and Loan-to-Value  165
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loan value), it is further assumed that the transaction cost associated with selling
the asset and repaying the loan is greater than the total cost of default.12
Then, by dividing the cash ﬂow terms in Equation (1) by A, the arguments of the
indirect utility function can be rewritten such that the purchased asset becomes
the nume ´raire. That is, if W  w/A and X  x/A, then the total indirect utility
from the cash ﬂow associated with a mortgaged asset—quantiﬁed in asset units—
becomes:
(W, L, r)  U(W  L)
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX 
LLrW
LLrW
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX , (2) 
X
where (), U(), and V() is a transformation of (), u(), and v(), respectively,
and ƒ(X) is a transformation of g(x) when shifting from dollar units to the
nume ´raire.
Now, denote the partial derivative of U(W  L) and V(W  X  L  Lr)b yU
and V, respectively. Then, differentiating Equation (2) with respect to W produces,
after reorganizing:
X 
 U   Vƒ(X)dX  0. (3)
LLrW W
The resulted inequality sign in Equation (3) implies that borrower utility increases,
as expected, with initial endowment.
Likewise, differentiating () in Equation (2) with respect to r yields, after
reorganizing:
X 
  VLƒ(X)dX  0, (4)
LLrW r
and differentiating () in Equation (2) with respect to L yields, after reorganizing:166  Ben-Shahar
X 
 U   V(1  r)ƒ(X)dX. (5)
LLrW L
The middle expression in Equation (4) is always negative, which produces the
inequality sign. That is, the borrower’s utility is inversely affected by the loan
interest rate. Furthermore, note that in Equation (5) for a sufﬁciently large value





Equation (5) and the inequality in (5a) imply that the borrower generates
particularly high utility from increasing the LTV ratio in the ﬁrst period.
Intuitively, on one hand, increasing the LTV ratio allows the borrower to purchase
an asset that otherwise would have been unaffordable. On the other hand,
increasing the LTV also raises the amount to be repaid. However, because of
limited liability, repayment occurs only when the borrower’s ﬁnancial situation is
relatively favorable. Consistent with conventional wisdom, it is assumed that the
former effect overpowers the latter.
Now, denote the second partial derivative of U(W  L) and V(W  X  L  Lr)
by U and V, respectively. Then, twice differentiating () with respect to r and
W produces:
X 2  
  V(0)Lƒ(L  Lr  W)  VLƒ(X)dX . 
LLrW rW
(6)
Note that the sign of 2/rW is ambiguous. That is, on one hand, due to risk
aversion, V  0. On the other hand, raising W increases the no-default probability
and, thus, the probability that the required interest will eventually be repaid. It is




Similarly, twice differentiating () with respect to L and W generates:Default, Credit Scoring, and Loan-to-Value  167
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2  
 U   V(0)(1  r)ƒ(L  Lr  W)  LW
X
 V(1  r)ƒ(X)dX . (7) 
LLrW
Again, the sign of the right-hand side of Equation (7) is indeﬁnite. On one hand,
due to risk aversion, the second derivative of the periodic indirect utility functions,
U and V, is negative. On the other hand, the probability of no-default rises with
W and falls with L. According to conventional wisdom, however, the lower the




Consider now a risk-neutral lender. The present value of the lender’s proﬁt
function from the loan, (), is:
1
(w, L, A, r, I)  LA 
1  rƒ
x
  LA(1  r)g(x)dx 
LALArw
LALArw
 Ig(x)dx , (8) 
x
where rƒ, rƒ  r, is the risk-free rate of return and I is the lender’s income in the
case that the borrower experiences default. Equation (8) states that the lender’s
proﬁt consists of the ﬁrst period cash outﬂow, LA, and the second period income
is LA(1  r) if no default occurs and I otherwise, all discounted by one plus the
risk-free rate.14
In order to prevent arbitrage proﬁts on the part of the lender, assume that I 
LA(1  rƒ). Hence, without loss of generality, let I  0. Therefore, rewriting the
lender’s proﬁt in Equation (8) in units of the nume ´raire (by dividing all cash ﬂows
by the cost of the purchased asset, A) produces:168  Ben-Shahar
X 1
	(W, L, r)  L  L(1  r) ƒ(X)dX, (9)
LLrW 1  rƒ
where 	() is a transformation of () when shifting from dollars to the nume `raire,
	()  ()/A, X  x/A, and ƒ(X) is a transformation of g(x).
Now, differentiating 	() with respect to W yields:
	 1
 L(1  r)ƒ(L  Lr  W)  0. (10)
W 1  rƒ
The right-hand side of Equation (10) is always positive, implying that the lender’s
proﬁt rises with the borrower’s endowment. Intuitively, a rise in the level of W
reduces the default probability, thereby increasing the lender’s expected revenue,
ceteris paribus.
Likewise, differentiating 	() with respect to r generates:
X 	 L
  ƒ(X)dX  L(1  r)ƒ(L  Lr  W), 
LLrW r 1  rƒ
(11)
and differentiating 	() with respect to L produces:
	 1  r
 1 
L 1  rƒ
X
  ƒ(X)dX  L(1  r)ƒ(L  Lr  W) . (12) 
LLrW
The sign of the right-hand side of Equation (11) is ambiguous. Increasing the rate
of return, r, raises the value repaid by the borrower and therefore increases proﬁts.
Concurrently, however, a greater r is associated with an increased probability of
default, which decreases proﬁts. It is assumed, according to market conventional
wisdom, that the interest rate on the loan is in the range where the former effect
overpowers the latter, implying that the rate of return on the loan positively affects
proﬁts.15 That is:Default, Credit Scoring, and Loan-to-Value  169




The sign of the right-hand side of Equation (12) is also indeﬁnite. On one hand,
increasing L raises the total amount lent, thereby increasing the present value of
the total net return if no-default occurs, [(1  r)/(1  rƒ)  1]L. On the other
hand, increasing L raises the probability of the borrower’s default, which
diminishes lender’s expected income. Thus, it is assumed that the level of L is in





 Screening Equilibrium in a Competitive Market
Consider now a mortgage market with two types of borrowers, denoted by 1 and
2, who are differentiated by their initial endowment (in units of the nume ´raire),
W. Let W1 (W2) be the initial endowment of borrower 1 (2), where W1  W2.
Also, suppose that from the lenders perspective, both borrowers’ second period
wealth shock, X, arises ex ante from the same distribution.17 Finally, suppose 
 is
the share of type 2 borrowers in the total borrowing population.
One can see from Equation (2) that borrower 2 is more likely to default than
borrower 1, ceteris paribus. Suppose that each borrower’s initial endowment is
privately observed by the borrower and is unobservable to lenders.18 Then, lenders
cannot distinguish between the borrowers’ default risk. Under competitive market
conditions, however, borrowers can be screened by a self-selection process. That
is, suppose (L1, r1) and (L2, r2) represent a combination of the LTV ratio and the
interest rate on the loan offered by lenders and selected by borrower 1 and 2,
respectively. Then:
Proposition 1: There exists a competitive screening equilibrium in which the
higher the borrower’s default risk is, the greater are the LTV ratio and the interest
rate on the loan. That is, L2  L1 and r2  r1.
Proof: Given L1, L2, r1, and r2, and following Equations (2) and (9), a self-selection
process occurs in a competitive market if the lender generates zero proﬁt from
the offered contracts:170  Ben-Shahar
X 1
	(W , L , r )  L  L (1  r ) ƒ(x)dx 22 2 2 2 2
L LrW 1  r 22 2 2 ƒ
1
 L  L (1  r ) 11 1 1  rƒ
X
 ƒ(x)dx  	(W , L , r )  0, 11 1
L LrW 11 1 1
(13)
where borrower 1 chooses the combination of L1 and r1 over the alternative:
(W , L , r )  U(W  L ) 11 1 1 1
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  11 1 1
L LrW 11 1 1
L LrW 11 1 1
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  U(W  L )  12
X
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  12 2 2
L LrW 22 2 1
L LrW 22 2 1
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r ),  12 2
X (14)
and borrower 2 chooses the combination of L2 and r2 over the alternative:
(W , L , r )  U(W  L ) 22 2 2 2
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  22 2 2
L LrW 22 2 2
L LrW 22 2 2
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  U(W  L )  21
X
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  21 1 1
L LrW 11 1 2
L LrW 11 1 2
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r ).  21 1
X (15)Default, Credit Scoring, and Loan-to-Value  171
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Given that W1  W2 and following inequalities (10), (11a), and (12a), for Equation
(13) to hold, it cannot be the case that both r1  r2 and L1  L2. Also, following
inequalities (4) and (5a), for inequality (14) to hold, it may not be the case that
both r1  r2 and L1  L2. Likewise, following inequalities (4) and (5a), then for
inequality (15) to hold, it cannot be the case that both r2  r1 and L2  L1. Finally,
it follows from inequalities (6a) and (7a) that for inequalities (14) and (15) to
simultaneously hold, it cannot be the case that both r1  r2 and L1  L2. Hence,
r2  r1 and L2  L1. 
Proposition 1 is consistent with the result obtained in Brueckner (2000) and in
Harrison, Noordewier, and Yavas (2004) for the case where default costs are low.
Intuitively, due to a lower initial endowment, it is more valuable for the riskier
borrower to obtain a high LTV ratio than it is for the safer borrower, ceteris
paribus. The high LTV ratio allows the borrower with the smaller initial
endowment (and who thus experiences a greater default risk) to seek an asset that
otherwise would have remained implausible. Put differently, it is less costly for
the safer borrower who experiences a greater initial endowment to decrease the
demanded LTV ratio on the loan. In return, however, the latter pays a lower
interest rate.
Exhibit 1 in Appendix A demonstrates the existence of the equilibrium stated in
Proposition 1. In this example, consider a four-borrower framework, where W1 
W2  W3  W4. The actual numbers in Exhibit 1 are of course imaginary and are
for illustration only. They show, however, the concept under which the lower initial
endowment is associated with greater LTV, higher interest rate, and greater default
risk in equilibrium.
 Screening Equilibrium in a Non-Competitive Market
Screening equilibrium can also prevail under imperfect competition market
conditions.19 For simplicity, consider a mortgage market with two lenders: j
and k.
Proposition 2: There exists a duopolistic Nash screening equilibrium in which the
higher the borrower’s default risk is, the greater are the LTV ratio and the interest
rate on the loan. That is, L2  L1 and r2  r1.
Proof: Let the lender’s common knowledge strategy be to offer (ri, Li)  (r ˆi, L ˆ
i),
i  {1, 2}, if the other lender offers (ri, Li)  (r ˆi, L ˆ
i), where (r ˆi, L ˆ
i) is a combination
of interest rate and LTV that maximizes the lender’s proﬁt, given the other lender’s
strategy and given the borrower types in the market [see Equations (13a)–(15a)];
otherwise, if the other lender offers (ri, Li)  where i (r ˆi, L ˆ
i) for (r,L), (r, L) ii ii
some i and 	( )  0, then offer (ri, Li)  (. 20 Let borrower i’s strategy r, L, r, L) ii ii
be to accept the best offer of (ri, Li), such that (ri, Li) is weakly preferred to
( ) by borrower i, where ( ) represents a locus generating utility level no ˆˆ ˆ r, Lˆ r, L ii ii
less than otherwise, reject. ˆ ; i172  Ben-Shahar
The speciﬁed strategies are consistent with the following conditions for a
separating equilibrium under the duopolistic market structure. Lender j maximizes
proﬁts under the constraint imposed by the other lender and the borrowers. That
is, lender j:
Max 	(W , W , L , L , r , r , 
) j 12 1 2 1 2
L ,L ,r ,r 1 212
X 1
 
 L  L (1  r ) ƒ(x)dx  22 2
L LrW 1  r 22 2 2 ƒ
X 1
 (1  
) L  L (1  r ) ƒ(x)dx ,  11 1
L LrW 1  r 11 1 1 ƒ
(13a)
subject to lender k:
	 (W , W , L , L , r , r , 
) k 12 1 2 1 2
X 1
 
 L  L (1  r ) ƒ(x)dx  22 2
L Lrw 1  r 22 22 ƒ
X 1
 (1  
) L  L (1  r ) ƒ(x)dx ,  11 1
L LrW 1  r 11 1 1 ƒ
(13b)
and borrower 1 chooses the combination of L1 and r1 over the alternative:
ˆ   (W , L , r )  U(W  L ) 11 1 1 1 1
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  11 1 1
L LrW 11 1 1
L LrW 11 1 1
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  U(W  L )  12
X
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  12 2 2
L LrW 22 2 1
L LrW 22 2 1
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r ), (14a)  12 2
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and borrower 2 chooses the combination of L2 and r2 over the alternative:
ˆ   (W , L , r )  U(W  L ) 22 2 2 2 2
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  22 2 2
L LrW 22 2 2
L LrW 22 2 2
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  U(W  L )  21
X
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  21 1 1
L LrW 11 1 2
L LrW 11 1 2
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r ), (15a)  21 1
X
where 	j and 	k are lender j’s and k’s proﬁt, respectively,  (Wi, L ˆ
i, r ˆi), i  ˆ i
{1, 2}, and 
 is the share of type 2 borrowers in the total borrowing population.
Due to the complexity of this problem, a numerical solution is offered in order to
demonstrate the existence of the equilibrium stated in Proposition 2. The
demonstration is presented in Exhibit 2 in Appendix A for a four-borrower case,
where W1  W2  W3  W4. 
That is, under imperfect competition market conditions, the lenders maximize
proﬁts subject to the reaction function of other lenders in the market and subject
to screening borrowers, while providing them a given level of utility. Proposition
2 shows that due to limited competition, the lenders can separate borrowers, such
that  and  while extracting a greater share of the consumer surplus rr LL , 21 2 1
relative to the competition case (compare Exhibits 1 and 2 in Appendix A).
 Combined Signaling and Screening Equilibrium in a
Competitive Market
Now, suppose that prior to obtaining a mortgage loan, a borrower accumulates a
credit history. Furthermore, when applying for a loan, the borrower is required to
present the credit record to lenders and thereby attains a credit score.21
A good credit history, however, is attained at a cost: the higher the credit score,
the more costly it is for the borrower to establish it. Consistent, for example, with
Ben-Shahar and Feldman (2003), the cost of establishing a good credit record
follows from the borrower’s need to perform well in all pre-mortgage loans. The
borrower is required, for example, to limit the accounts opened within the past
twelve months, to maintain the balances on revolving credit sufﬁciently distant174  Ben-Shahar
from the maximum limit, to maintain good public records (such as tax liens,
judgments, or bankruptcies), to retain no recent credit card balances, to limit the
amount of recent credit inquiries, etc.22
Denote the cost (in units of the nume ´raire) of establishing a credit history that
generates a credit score by s, where a greater s is associated with a better credit
score. Then, in the presence of a credit scoring system, Equation (2) becomes:
s
(W, L, r)  UW  L  	 W
X





where the only difference between Equations (2) and (2a) is the subtraction of the
cost of acquiring a credit score, s/W, in the latter equation as an argument of the
ﬁrst period indirect utility function. That is, the cost associated with maintaining
a given credit record (and, thereby, attaining the corresponding credit score)
declines with the level of one’s initial wealth. Partially differentiating Equation
(2a) with respect to s generates:
 1 s
 U W  L  0, (16) 	 sW W
where the inequality sign follows from the positive ﬁrst derivative of the ﬁrst
period indirect utility function.
Further, twice differentiating Equation (2a) with respect to s and W yields:
2   1 s
 U W  L  	 2 sWW W
1 ss
 U W  L  1  0. (17) 	  	 2 WW W
That is, the marginal cost (in utility terms) of increasing the credit score declines
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Now, for simplicity, suppose that two feasible credit scores with costs sh and sl
can be acquired by borrowers, where sh  sl. Thus, sh (sl) corresponds to a better
(worse) credit score. Further, consider a case where there are four borrowers in
the market, who are differentiated by their initial endowment, W. Let Wi be the
privately observed initial endowment of borrower i, i  {1, 2, 3, 4}, where W1 
W2  W3  W4. It follows from Equation (2a) that the probability of default rises
when shifting from borrower 1 to borrower 4, ceteris paribus.
Denote the LTV ratio, loan interest rate, and credit score selected by borrower i
by Li, ri, i  {1, 2, 3, 4}, and sm, m  {h, l}, respectively.
Proposition 3: There exists a competitive combined signaling and screening
equilibrium in which, within the entire borrowing population, safer (riskier)
borrowers acquire the better (worse) credit score. Furthermore, within each subset
of borrowers with identical credit scores, safer (riskier) borrowers attain a loan
with a lower (higher) LTV ratio and a lower (higher) interest rate. That is, s1 
s2  sh, s3  s4  sl, L4  L3, L2  L1, r4  r3, and r2  r1.
Proof: See formulization of the equilibrium conditions of Proposition 3 in
Appendix B. Also, due to the complexity of the problem, the existence of the
equilibrium is demonstrated by a numerical solution in Exhibit 3 in Appendix
A. 
Proposition 3 asserts that under a combined signaling and screening equilibrium,
borrowers are ﬁrst partially separated into subsets according to their signal (credit
score). Then, depending on their credit score, they are offered a menu of mortgage
loans varying by LTV ratio and interest rate, by which a self-selection process
occurs and a fully revealing equilibrium is attained.
Speciﬁcally, the subset of the safer borrowers (types 1 and 2) is separated from
the subset of the riskier borrowers (types 3 and 4) by signaling: types 1 and 2
acquire a higher credit score than that acquired by types 3 and 4.23 Moreover,
within the same credit score subset, types are screened by their choice combination
of LTV ratio and interest rate. As shown in the screening-only equilibrium
presented earlier, in each subset, the borrower with the greater probability of
default opts for the loan with the higher LTV ratio and the greater interest rate.
Hence, for example, borrowers 1 and 2, who both choose the better credit score
at a cost of sh (see the example in Exhibit 3, where sh  0.019) are separated by
their distinct choice combination of LTV ratio and interest rate, where borrower
1 (2) selects a loan with a lower (higher) LTV ratio and a lower (higher) interest
rate than that chosen by borrower 2 (1).
Furthermore, borrowers who acquire different signals (different credit scores) are
separated into different subsets (classiﬁed into different risk categories). In
equilibrium, however, it must hold that loans offered to borrowers in one subset
will not motivate others to shift to that subset by selecting a different signal.176  Ben-Shahar
An empirical implication of the combined signaling and screening equilibrium is
that the LTV is positively related to default risk only within each subset of credit
scores but not over the entire population. In Exhibit 3, for example, one can see
that borrowers 2 and 4 opt for a higher LTV than that chosen by borrowers 1 and
3, respectively. Yet, borrower 3’s LTV is, at the same time, lower than that of
borrowers 1 and 2, despite the former’s greater default risk. This situation becomes
possible due to the use of credit scores by which borrower 3 is categorized into
the subset of the higher default risks. In this higher risk category, borrowers simply
pay higher interest rates, ceteris paribus.24
 Combined Signaling and Screening Equilibrium in a
Non-Competitive Market
Combined signaling and screening equilibrium also attains under imperfect
competition market conditions.
Proposition 4: There exists duopolistic Nash combined signaling and screening
equilibrium in which, within the entire borrowing population, safer (riskier)
borrowers acquire the better (worse) credit score. Furthermore, within each subset
of borrowers with identical credit scores, safer (riskier) borrowers attain a loan
with a lower (higher) LTV ratio and a lower (higher) interest rate. That is, s1 
s2  sh, s3  s4  sl, L4  L3, L2  L1, r4  r3, and r2  r1.
Proof: The formulization of the necessary conditions of the equilibrium described
in Proposition 4 is immediate following that of Propositions 2 and 3. Due to the
complexity of the problem, the existence of the equilibrium is demonstrated by a
numerical solution in Exhibit 4 in Appendix A. 
Proposition 3 argues that the combined signaling and screening equilibrium could
be attained in a competitive mortgage market. Proposition 4 complements this
argument by claiming that the combined signaling and screening equilibrium could
also be attained under non-competitive conditions.
 Welfare and Income Distribution Implications
It follows from Propositions 3 and 4:
Corollary: Given a credit scoring system, both safer and riskier borrowers might
achieve either high or low LTV ratios.
Proof: Due to the complexity of the problem, the proof is shown by demonstration
in Exhibits 3 and 4 in Appendix A. Note that under both competitive (Exhibit 3)
and non-competitive (Exhibit 4) market frameworks, a combined signaling and
screening equilibrium can be attained where, for example, W1  W2  W3 and
yet L2  L1  L3. That is, a safer borrower attains either a higher or a lower LTV
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Because of the partial separation generated by credit scores and the distribution
into subsets that follows, borrowers who, ex ante, exhibit different levels of default
risk, and who thus fall into a different subset of borrowers, might be offered either
greater, lower, or identical LTV ratios in equilibrium. In that case, the difference
in their ex ante default risk is only incorporated into the cost of their loan, that
is, the requested interest rate.
The Corollary therefore implies that empirical research that examines the
relationship between default risk and the attained interest rate must also
incorporate the interrelation of the credit score.
Ben-Shahar and Feldman (2003) show the conditions under which the competitive
combined signaling and screening equilibrium (with credit record, loan maturity,
and interest rate) Pareto dominates the competitive screening equilibrium (with
loan maturity and interest rate). Similarly, the model here shows that while the
welfare of all lenders and some borrowers does not alter when shifting from
screening equilibrium to combined signaling and screening equilibrium under
competitive market conditions, the welfare of other borrowers may increase.
Furthermore, when shifting from a screening equilibrium to a combined signaling
and screening equilibrium under imperfect competition market conditions, the
produced gain reallocates in favor of lenders.
Proposition 5: If signaling cost is sufﬁciently small, then in a competitive market,
the combined signaling and screening equilibrium Pareto dominates the screening
equilibrium. Moreover, while lenders are indifferent between the two equilibria,
borrowers are better off under the combined signaling and screening equilibrium.
Proposition 6: If signaling cost is sufﬁciently small, then in a duopolistic market,
the combined signaling and screening equilibrium Pareto dominates the screening
equilibrium. Moreover, while borrowers are indifferent between the two equilibria,
lenders are better off under the combined signaling and screening equilibrium.
Proof: Due to the complexity of the problem, the proof is shown by demonstration
in the exhibits in Appendix A. First, comparing Exhibits 1 and 3, where a
numerical example is presented for the screening equilibrium and the combined
signaling and screening equilibrium, respectively, one can immediately see that
while lenders maintain zero proﬁts under both competitive frameworks, borrowers
experience a Pareto improvement shifting from the screening equilibrium (see
Exhibit 1) to the combined signaling and screening equilibrium (see Exhibit 3).
Particularly, focusing on the utility level, (Wi, Li, ri), note that while borrower
3 and 4 maintain their utility level, borrowers 1 and 2 experience an increase in
their utility. Similarly, comparing Exhibits 2 and 4, one can see that while all
borrowers attain the same utility level when shifting from the screening
equilibrium (see Exhibit 2) to the combined signaling and screening equilibrium
(see Exhibit 4), lenders yet generate higher total proﬁts under the latter
(particularly, the proﬁt generated from borrowers 1 and 2 rises from 0.05 to
0.12). 178  Ben-Shahar
The essential idea underlying Propositions 5 and 6 is that total welfare may
increase when complementing the screening mechanism (the combination of LTV
and interest rate menus) with a credit scoring system. If borrower types are ﬁrst
grouped into subsets according to their credit scores, then when progressing to
the screening stage, the ‘‘good’’ (safer) borrowers in each post-signaling subset
need only to separate themselves from the members of the subset as opposed to
separating themselves from the entire population. According to Propositions 5 (6),
the gain that derives under this altered structure will go to the borrower (lender),
if the market is competitive (non-competitive).
 Conclusion
The task of empirical and theoretical studies of mortgage default is, among other
things, to improve the pricing of default risk, which is necessary for the efﬁcient
operation of both primary and secondary mortgage markets. In this context, the
analysis of mortgage default is extended under asymmetric information. Most
importantly, it is shown that under a system of credit scoring and a menu of LTV
ratios and interest rates, a combined signaling and screening equilibrium is
attained, where borrowers ﬁrst signal their default risk by selecting a credit score,
resulting in same-credit-score sub-groups of borrowers being formed. Then,
lenders screen each sub-group by offering different combinations of LTV ratio
and interest rate, thus producing a fully separating combined signaling and
screening equilibrium.
The paper demonstrates the prevalence of the combined signaling and screening
equilibrium under both competitive and non-competitive market frameworks.
Moreover, the welfare and income distribution effect of supplementing a credit
scoring system is examined under these two market settings. Ben-Shahar and
Feldman (2003) show that borrowers are the beneﬁciary party from the
establishment of a credit record signaling system (when screening by loan maturity
and interest rate prevails) under a competitive market framework. This result is
extended here by showing that lenders become the beneﬁting party from the
establishment of a credit scoring signaling system (in addition to screening by a
menu of LTV and interest rate) under an imperfect competition market setup.
While default in the model occurs due to liquidity crunch, it is possible to employ
a similar setting, where default follows ruthless discretion. In that case, the value
of the property (as opposed to borrower income) becomes the random variable,
and default occurs if the latter falls below the loan balance. Future research may
address this approach.
Furthermore, empirical research ﬁnds indecisive correlation between LTV ratio
and default probability.25 The model presented here suggests that for testing the
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the interrelation among LTV ratio, credit score, and interest rate. Speciﬁcally, it
is predicted that within each same-credit-score sub-group, there is a positive
correlation between LTV ratio and default probability. However, if categorization
by credit scores is omitted from the analysis, one might falsely detect that no such
relationship exists.
 Appendix A
Exhibit 1: Demonstrating the existence of the equilibrium stated in Proposition
1, where U()  ln(), V()  ln(), and ƒ() is a uniform density function on the
domain [0, 3]. That is, X 
 U(0, 3). In addition, rƒ  0.02 and   0.9. (Wi,
Li, ri) represents borrower i’s indirect utility from own mortgage loan and (Wi,
Lj, rj), (Wi, Lk, rk), and (Wi, Lm, rm) represent i’s indirect utility from the
mortgage selected by borrowers j, k, and m, respectively, where j, k, m  i and
appear in an increasing order.
Borrower 1 Borrower 2 Borrower 3 Borrower 4
Wi 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.45
Li 0.790 0.806 0.829 0.876
ri 0.047 0.111 0.196 0.349
(Wi, Li, ri) 0.9144 0.8317 0.7440 0.6507
(Wi, Lj, rj) 0.9141 0.8316 0.7434 0.6490
(Wi, Lk, rk) 0.9133 0.8313 0.7439 0.6500
(Wi, Lm, rm) 0.9106 0.8292 0.7429 0.6507
	(Wi, Li, ri) 0000
X  ƒ(X)dX
L LrW ii i i
0.974 0.918 0.853 0.756
Exhibit 2: Demonstrating the existence of the equilibrium stated in Proposition
2, where U()  ln(), V()  ln(), and ƒ() is a uniform density function on the
domain [0, 3]. In addition, rƒ  0.02,   0.9, and each borrower type contains
the same number of borrowers. (Wi, Li, ri) represents borrower i’s indirect utility
from own mortgage loan and (Wi, Lj, rj), (Wi, Lk, rk), and (Wi, Lm, rm)
represent i’s indirect utility from the mortgage selected by borrowers j, k, and m,
respectively, where j, k, m  i and appear in an increasing order.180  Ben-Shahar
Borrower 1 Borrower 2 Borrower 3 Borrower 4
Wi 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.45
Li 0.729 0.743 0.763 0.795
ri 0.113 0.177 0.260 0.385
(Wi, Li, ri) 0.8764 0.7911 0.7005 0.6036
(Wi, Lj, rj) 0.8763 0.7908 0.6994 0.6012
(Wi, Lk, rk) 0.8758 0.7910 0.7001 0.6025
(Wi, Lm, rm) 0.8736 0.7893 0.6996 0.6036
	(Wi, Li, ri) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
X  ƒ(X)dX
L LrW ii i i
0.980 0.925 0.863 0.783
Exhibit 3: Demonstrating the existence of the equilibrium stated in Proposition
3, where U()  ln(), V()  ln(), and ƒ() is a uniform density function on the
domain [0, 3]. In addition, rf  0.02 and   0.9. (Wi, Li, ri) represents borrower
i’s indirect utility from own mortgage loan and (Wi, Lj, rj), (Wi, Lk, rk), and
(Wi, Lm, rm) represents i’s indirect utility from the mortgage selected by
borrowers j, k, and m, respectively, where j, k, m  i and appear in an increasing
order.
Borrower 1 Borrower 2 Borrower 3 Borrower 4
Wi 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.45
Li 0.842 0.865 0.829 0.876
ri 0.076 0.154 0.196 0.349
si 0.019 0.019 0 0
(Wi, Li, ri) 0.9193 0.8347 0.7440 0.6507
(Wi, Lj, rj) 0.9190 0.8346 0.7432 0.6432
(Wi, Lk, rk) 0.9133 0.8313 0.7439 0.6447
(Wi, Lm, rm) 0.9106 0.8292 0.7429 0.6507
	(Wi, Li, ri) 0000
X  ƒ(X)dX
L LrW ii i i
0.948 0.884 0.853 0.756
Exhibit 4: Demonstrating the existence of the equilibrium stated in Proposition
4, where U()  ln(), V()  ln(), and ƒ() is a uniform density function on the
domain [0,3]. In addition, rf  0.02,   0.9, and each borrower type contains
the same number of borrowers. (Wi, Li, ri) represents borrower i’s indirect utility
from own mortgage loan and (Wi, Lj, rj), (Wi, Lk, rk), and (Wi, Lm, rm)Default, Credit Scoring, and Loan-to-Value  181
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represents i’s indirect utility from the mortgage selected by borrowers j, k, and m,
respectively, where j, k, m  i and appear in an increasing order.
Borrower 1 Borrower 2 Borrower 3 Borrower 4
Wi 0.75 0.65 0.55 0.45
Li 0.816 0.909 0.763 0.795
ri 0.301 0.534 0.260 0.385
si 0.019 0.019 0 0
(Wi, Li, ri) 0.8764 0.7911 0.7005 0.6036
(Wi, Lj, rj) 0.8763 0.7900 0.6956 0.5928
(Wi, Lk, rk) 0.8758 0.7910 0.6993 0.5994
(Wi, Lm, rm) 0.8736 0.7893 0.6996 0.6036
	(Wi, Li, ri) 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.05
X  ƒ(X)dX
L LrW ii i i
0.895 0.752 0.863 0.783
 Appendix B
Equilibrium conditions of Proposition 3. Following Equations (2a) and (9), a
combined signaling and screening separation by credit score, LTV ratio, and
interest rate in a competitive market is attained in equilibrium when the following
is maintained:
The lender generates zero proﬁts from all offered contracts:
	(W , L , r )  	(W , L , r )  	(W , L , r ) 11 1 22 2 33 3
 	(W , L , r )  0, (A1) 44 4
where borrower 1 chooses the combination of sh, L1, and r1 over the three
alternatives:182  Ben-Shahar
sh (W , L , r , s )  UW  L  	 11 1 h 11 W1
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  11 1 1
L LrW 11 1 1
L LrW 11 1 1 sh  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 12
X W1
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  12 2 2
L LrW 22 2 1
L LrW 22 2 1
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s ), (A2a)  12 2 h
X
sh (W , L , r , s )  UW  L  	 11 1 h 11 W1
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  11 1 1
L LrW 11 1 1
L LrW 11 1 1 sl  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 13
X W1
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  13 3 3
L LrW 33 3 1
L LrW 33 3 1
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s), (A2b)  13 3 l
X
sh (W , L , r , s )  UW  L  	 11 1 h 11 W1
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  11 1 1
L LrW 11 1 1
L LrW 11 1 1 sl  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 14
X W1
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  14 4 4
L LrW 44 4 1
L LrW 44 4 1
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s), (A2c)  14 4 l
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borrower 2 chooses the combination of sh, L2, and r2 over the three alternative
combinations:
sh (W , L , r , s )  UW  L  	 22 2 h 22 W2
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  22 2 2
L LrW 22 2 2
L LrW 22 2 2 sh  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 21
X W2
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  21 1 1
L LrW 11 1 2
L LrW 11 1 2
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s ), (A3a)  21 1 h
X
sh (W , L , r , s )  UW  L  	 22 2 h 22 W2
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  22 2 2
L LrW 22 2 2
L LrW 22 2 2 sl  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 23
X W2
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  23 3 3
L LrW 33 3 2
L LrW 33 3 2
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s), (A3b)  23 3 l
X
sh (W , L , r , s )  UW  L  	 22 2 h 22 W2
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  22 2 2
L LrW 22 2 2
L LrW 22 2 2 sl  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 24
X W2
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  24 4 4
L LrW 44 4 2
L LrW 44 4 2
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s), (A3c)  24 4 l
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borrower 3 chooses the combination of sl, L3, and r3 over the three alternative
combinations:
sl (W , L , r , s)  UW  L  	 33 3 l 33 W3
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  33 3 3
L LrW 33 3 3
L LrW 33 3 3 sh  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 31
X W3
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  31 1 1
L LrW 11 1 3
L LrW 11 1 3
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s ), (A4a)  31 1 h
X
sl (W , L , r , s)  UW  L  	 33 3 l 33 W3
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  33 3 3
L LrW 33 3 3
L LrW 33 3 3 sh  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 32
X W3
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  32 2 2
L LrW 22 2 3
L LrW 22 2 3
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s ), (A4b)  32 2 h
X
sl (W , L , r , s)  UW  L  	 33 3 l 33 W3
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  33 3 3
L LrW 33 3 3
L LrW 33 3 3 sl  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 34
X W3
X
  V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  34 4 4
L LrW 44 4 3
L LrW 44 4 3
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s), (A4c)  34 4 l
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and borrower 4 chooses the combination of sl, L4, and r4 over the three alternative
combinations:
sl (W , L , r , s)  UW  L  	 44 4 l 44 W4
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  44 4 4
L LrW 44 4 4
L LrW 44 4 4 sh  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 41
X W4
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  41 1 1
L LrW 11 1 4
L LrW 11 1 4
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s ), (A5a)  41 1 h
X
sl (W , L , r , s)  UW  L  	 44 4 l 44 W4
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  44 4 4
L LrW 44 4 4
L LrW 44 4 4 sh  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 42
X W4
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  42 2 2
L LrW 22 2 4
L LrW 22 2 4
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s ), (A5b)  42 2 h
X
sl (W , L , r , s)  UW  L  	 44 4 l 44 W4
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  44 4 4
L LrW 44 4 4
L LrW 44 4 4 sl  V(0)ƒ(X)dX  UW  L   	 43
X W4
X
   V(W  X  L  Lr)ƒ(X)dX  43 3 3
L LrW 33 3 4
L LrW 33 3 4
 V(0)ƒ(X)dX  (W , L , r , s), (A5c)  43 3 l
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 Endnotes
1 See, for example, the empirical studies of Crawford and Rosenblatt (1995) and Epley,
Kartono, and Haney (1996) and the theoretical works of Kau, Keenan, and Kim (1993),
and Kau and Keenan (1999).
2 As described later in this section, this result is also consistent with Brueckner (2000)
and Harrison, Noordewier, and Yavas (2004). Also, note that the entire analysis of the
article is devoted to mortgage loans that have a certain level of default risk. The loans
in focus are, therefore, assumed to exhibit a LTV ratio beyond a minimum threshold
level.
3 In recent years, the FICO
 score has become the widely spread standard representing
borrowers’ credit records examined by lenders in processing loan applications. See
Straka (2000) for more information on credit scorings and Collins, Harvey, and Nigro
(2002) on their limitations.
4 Wang, Young, and Zhou (2002) argue that if screening of default risk is sufﬁciently
costly, it may also be optimal for the strategic lender to randomly reject workout
requests, where the likelihood of this strategy rises when borrowers cannot observe the
lenders’ screening policies.
5 Reinforcement of this prediction can be found in Campbell and Dietrich (1983), who
ﬁnd that the relationship between LTV ratio and the likelihood to default is negative for
the 80%–90% LTV range, and positive beyond the 90% level. As pointed out by the
authors, this result might be due to adverse selection. Also, in examining multifamily
mortgage loans, Archer, Elmer, Harrison, and Ling (2002) ﬁnd that the LTV ratio does
not signiﬁcantly contribute to the explanatory power of default. Both studies, however,
do not incorporate the interrelated effect among credit score, LTV, and interest rate.
6 Other papers that examine mortgage default under asymmetric information include, for
example, Posey and Yavas (2001), Ben-Shahar (2006), and Ben-Shahar, Benchetrit, and
Sulganik (forthcoming).
7 For more on the lack of competition in the U.S. mortgage market, see Beyer, Dziobek,
and Garrett (1999), Van Order (2000), Harvey and Nigro (2003), and Downing, Jaffee,
and Wallace (2005).
8 It is assumed that x is sufﬁciently small (large) to yield default (loan repayment) as (x)
will be seen next.
9 As opposed to focusing on the indirect utility function, one could alternatively choose
to model the problem focusing on the user costs function. The latter would of course
require some adjustments.
10 That is, default is motivated by liquidity crunch as opposed to ruthless maximization of
the value of the default option. For empirical evidence that undermines the pure ruthless
discretion assumption in this context, see, for example, Deng, Quigley, and Van Order
(1996), Yang, Buist, and Megbolugbe (1998), and Deng and Quigley (2002). Also, note
that the framework presented is consistent with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), who also
consider initial wealth as the underlying force that produces different levels of risk on
the part of the borrowers.
11 If, instead, c is maintained to be small and positive, the results will sustain, however,
the equations that follow will be somewhat less tractable.Default, Credit Scoring, and Loan-to-Value  187
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12 That is, if the borrower’s total transaction costs associated with default are denoted by
T, then it is necessary to assume that T  A  LA(1  r)  B, where B is the total
transaction costs accompanying the sale of the asset and the repayment of the loan.
13 In fact, it is sufﬁcient to assume in (6a) that 
2/rW  0. That is, the negative
marginal utility that follows an increase in the interest rate becomes less meaningful as
the initial endowment becomes greater.
14 One might argue that the lender’s income in case of default, I, might be a function of
the borrower’s wealth, W. In this case, the results may sustain, however, additional
conditions will be required. Also, note that discounting using the risk-free rate is not a
necessary assumption for the results that follow.
15 This assumption most likely holds for the prime mortgage market. As, for example, in
Ben-Shahar and Feldman (2003), the effect presented by Jaffee and Russell (1976),
where the lender’s proﬁt may fall with the loan rate due to adverse selection, is ignored.
16 Obviously, for some relatively low levels of L, the lender is better off increasing the
LTV as this extends the volume of the business. It is assumed here, however, that the
levels of L are in the range in which a marginal increase in the LTV is no longer
favorable, as its unfavorable effect on the probability of default dominates. See further
justiﬁcation for this assumption in the empirical evidence found, for example, in Deng,
Quigley, and Van Order (1996) and Lekkas, Quigley, and Van Order (1993). For other
theoretical justiﬁcation, see, for example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
17 This, of course, does not entail that the ex post shocks are also identical.
18 Indeed, borrowers are required to disclose their income and other ﬁnancial resources
when applying for a mortgage loan. Yet, moral hazard motivates borrowers to
misrepresent their true ﬁnancial status. Recognizing the effect of moral hazard, lenders
thus foresee the limitation of relying on borrowers’ reported ﬁnancial statements.
19 For other studies in which non-competitive equilibrium under asymmetric information
is derived, see, for example, Besanko and Thakor (1987), Villas-Boas and Schmidt-
Mohr (1999), Armstrong and Vickers (2001), and Rochet and Stole (2002).
20 Note that the assumptions underlying the described Nash equilibrium are different than
those under Bertrand equilibrium: while under the latter there exists a price competition,
where each lender conjectures that the other lender maintains its price ﬁxed (here the
price is determined by the combination of LTV and interest rate), it is assumed here
that each lender knows that the other lender will respond to a price change.
21 FICO credit scores are affected, among other things, by delinquencies, too many
accounts opened within the last twelve months, short credit history, balances on
revolving credit near the maximum limits, public records (such as tax liens, judgments,
or bankruptcies), no recent credit card balances, too many recent credit inquiries, too
few revolving accounts, and too many revolving accounts.
22 Also, it follows from the rational expectations assumption that the credit score attained
ex post is correctly anticipated ex ante (during the pre-mortgage years in which the
borrower manages debt).
23 In the attained separating equilibrium, wealthier (i.e., safer) borrowers acquire a better
credit score than that acquired by poorer (i.e., riskier) borrowers. However, note that the
cost of the credit score is inversely related to the initial endowment—that is, in order
to attain a credit score s, one needs to ‘‘invest’’ an amount equal to s/W [see Equation
(2a)]. Hence, wealthier borrowers do not necessarily ‘‘invest’’ more in acquiring a better188  Ben-Shahar
credit score. In the cases where the investment in the credit score does reduce the wealth
difference among borrowers with different initial endowments, it is yet assumed that the
amount invested in the credit score (s/W) is sufﬁciently small and does not change
borrowers’ wealth ranking overall.
24 As shown next, this empirical prediction holds for non-competitive markets as well.
25 See, for example, Campbell and Dietrich (1983), Lekkas, Quigley, and Van Order (1993),
Capozza, Kazarian, and Thomson (1997), and Archer, Elmer, Harrison, and Ling (2002).
 References
Archer, W.R., P.J. Elmer, D.M. Harrison, and D.C. Ling. Determinants of Multifamily
Mortgage Default. Real Estate Economics, 2002, 30:3, 445–73.
Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers. Competitive Price Discrimination. Rand Journal of
Economics, 2001, 32:4, 579–605.
Ben-Shahar, D. Screening Mortgage Default Risk: A Uniﬁed Theoretical Framework.
Journal of Real Estate Research, 2006, 28:3, 215–39.
Ben-Shahar, D., G. Benchetrit, and E. Sulganik, The Israeli Mortgage Market: Mortgage
Insurance as a Mechanism for Screening Default Risk. In: Mortgage Markets Worldwide.
D. Ben-Shahar, C. Leung, and S.E. Ong (eds.). Blackwell Publishers, Forthcoming.
Ben-Shahar, D. and D. Feldman. Signaling-Screening Equilibrium in the Mortgage Market.
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2003, 26:2/3, 157–78.
Besanko, D. and A. Thakor. Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic
and Competitive Credit Markets. International Economic Review, 1987, 28:3, 671–89.
Beyer, H-J., C. Dziobek, and J. Garrett. Economic and Legal Considerations of Optimal
Privatization: Case Studies of Mortgage Firms (DePfa Group and Fannie Mae). IMF
Working Paper No. 99/69, 1999.
Bond, P., D. Musto, and B. Yilmaz. Predatory Lending in a Rational World. Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, Working Papers 06-2, 2006.
Brueckner, J.K. Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information. Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics, 2000, 20:3, 251–74.
Campbell, T.S. and K.J. Dietrich. The Determinants of Default on Conventional Residential
Mortgages. Journal of Finance, 1983, 38, 1569–81.
Capozza, D.R., D. Kazarian, and T.A. Thomson. Mortgage Default in Local Markets. Real
Estate Economics, 1997, 25:4, 631–55.
Collins, C.M., K.D. Harvey, and P.J. Nigro. The Inﬂuence of Bureau Scores, Customized
Scores and Judgmental Review on the Bank Underwriting Decision-Making Process.
Journal of Real Estate Research, 2002, 24:2, 129–52.
Crawford, G.W. and E. Rosenblatt. Efﬁcient Mortgage Default Option Exercise: Evidence
from Loss Severity. Journal of Real Estate Research, 1995, 10:5, 543–55.
Deng, Y. and J.M. Quigley. Woodhead Behavior and the Pricing of Residential Mortgages.
USC Lusk Center for Real Estate Working Paper No. 2003-1005, 2002.
Deng, Y., J.M. Quigley, and R. Van Order. Mortgage Default and Low Downpayment
Loans: The Costs of Public Subsidy. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1996, 26,
263–85.
Devreux, M.P. and G. Lanot. Measuring Tax Incidence: An Application to Mortgage
Provision in the U.K. Journal of Public Economics, 2003, 87:7-8, 1747–78.Default, Credit Scoring, and Loan-to-Value  189
JRER  Vol. 30  No. 2 – 2008
Downing, C., D. Jaffee, and N. Wallace. Information Asymmetries in the Mortgage Backed
Securities Market. AFA 2006 Boston Meetings, 2005.
Epley, D.R., L. Kartono, and R. Haney. Borrower Risk Signaling Using Loan-to-Value
Ratios. Journal of Real Estate Research, 1996, 11, 71–86.
Gary-Bobo, R.J. and S. Larribeau. A Structural Econometric Model of Price Discrimination
in the French Mortgage Lending Industry. International Journal of Industrial Organization,
2004, 22:1, 101–34.
Gan, J. and T. Riddiough. Monopoly and Information Advantage in the Residential
Mortgage Market. Review of Financial Studies, 2008, Forthcoming.
Harvey, K.D. and P.J. Nigro. How Do Predatory Lending Laws Inﬂuence Mortgage Lending
in Urban Areas? A Tail of Two Cities. Journal of Real Estate Research, 2003, 25:4, 480–
508.
Harrison, D.M., T.G. Noordewier, and A. Yavas. Do Riskier Borrowers Borrow More? Real
Estate Economics, 2004, 32, 385–411.
Heffernan, S. Competition in the Canadian Personal Finance Sector. International Journal
of the Economics of Business, 1994, 1:3, 323–42.
Heffernan, S. U.K. Bank Services for Small Business: How Competitive is the Market?
Journal of Banking and Finance, 2006, 30:11, 3087–3110.
Hermalin, B.E. and D.M. Jaffee. The Privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
Implication for Mortgage Industry Structure. In Studies on Privatizing Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, Department of Housing and Urban Affairs, 1995.
Hyytinen, A. Loan Market Equilibrium with Difference of Opinion and Imperfect
Competition. Economics Letters, 2003, 78:1, 125–29.
Jaffee, D.M. and T. Russell. Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976, 90:4, 651–66.
Kau, J.B., D.C. Keenan, and T. Kim. Transaction Costs, Suboptimal Termination and
Default Probabilities. Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association, 1993, 21:3, 247–54.
Kau, J.B. and D.C. Keenan. Patterns of Rational Default. Regional Science and Urban
Economics, 1999, 29, 765–85.
Lekkas, V., J.M. Quigley, and R. Van Order. Loan Loss Severity and Optimal Mortgage
Default. Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, 1993,
21:4, 353–71.
Neven, D. and L-H. Roller. An Aggregate Structural Model of Competition in the European
Banking Industry. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1999, 17:7, 1059–74.
Niinimaki, J-P. The Effects of Competition on Banks’ Risk Taking. Journal of Economics,
2004, 81:3, 199–222.
Parlour, C.A. and U. Rajan. Competition in Loan Contracts. American Economic Review,
2001, 91:5, 1311–28.
Posey, L.L. and A. Yavas. Adjustable and Fixed Rate Mortgages as a Screening Mechanism
for Default Risk. Journal of Urban Economics, 2001, 49, 54–79.
Rochet, J-C. and L.A. Stole. Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation Constraints.
Review of Economic Studies, 2002, 69, 277–311.
Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss. Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.
American Economic Review, 1981, 71:3, 393–410.190  Ben-Shahar
Straka, J.W. A Shift in the Mortgage Landscape: The 1990s Move to Automated Credit
Evaluations. Journal of Housing Research, 2000, 11, 207–32.
Swank, J. Oligopoly in Loan and Deposit Markets: An Econometric Application to the
Netherlands. De Economist, 1995, 143:3, 353–66.
Van Order, R. The U.S. Market: A Model of Dueling Charters. Journal of Housing
Research, 2000, 11:2, 233–55.
Villas-Boas, M.J. and U. Schmidt-Mohr. Oligopoly with Asymmetric Information:
Differentiation in Credit Markets. RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 30:3, 375–96.
Wang, K., L. Young, and Y. Zhou. Nondiscriminating Foreclosure and Voluntary
Liquidating Costs. Review of Financial Studies, 2002, 15:3, 959–85.
Yang, T.T., H. Buist, and I.F. Megbolugbe. An Analysis of the Ex Ante Probabilities of
Mortgage Prepayment and Default. Real Estate Economics, 1998, 26:4, 651–76.
This article has received the American Real Estate Society Foundation Best Paper
Award, 8th AsRES International Conference. I would like to thank Brent Ambrose, Paul
Anglin, Stephen Cauley, David Genesove, Dwight Jaffee, and Susan Wachter for
helpful comments. I also thank the participants of the Behavioral Real Estate Finance
session at the AREUEA Annual Conference, Washington D.C., 2003, and the
participants of the 8th AsRES International Conference, Singapore, 2003.
Danny Ben-Shahar, Technion–Israel Institute of Technology, Technion City, Haifa
32000, Israel or dannyb@technion.ac.il.